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Class. 



SOME OBJECTIONS 



PROPOSED CONSTITUTION. 



BY 

ELI K, PRICE. 



PH ILADELPHIA: 
KIKG & BAIED, PRIfcTEES, 607 SANSOM STREET. 



187 3. 



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187 3 
.T7 



The following objections to the proposed Constitution were 
printed in The North American, The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, The Evening Telegraph, and Lancaster 
Examiner and Herald, between November 20th and No- 
vember 28M, 1873. They are reprinted in this form for 
more extended circulation. 



SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE PEOPOSED CONSTI- 
TUTION. 



No. 1. 

[The North American has already assumed the ground 
that the proposed Constitution should he favorably acted 
upon by .the people ; but we deem it thoroughly just that 
both sides of the question may have fair hearing, and 
most willingly give place, therefore, to the following com- 
munication upon the subject, written as the signature will 
show, by a gentleman whose opinions are always entitled 
to the most careful consideration.] 

Article II. Section 16. The State shall be divided into 
fifty Senatorial districts, according to population. That 
is, with a State population of 3,500,000, each Senator 
should represent 70,000 people. Philadelphia, with over 
700,000 people, should have ten Senators, to be equally 
represented with other parts of the State. She can now 
have but eight Senators ; and as the city increases in 
population in a faster ratio than the whole State, such 
disparity wi 1 increase as long as the Constitution shall so 
stand. Is this according to Republican principles ? Is 
not one freeman as good as another? The Declaration of 
Independence taught us to believe as much. The first 
line in article one, section one, of this proposed Constitu- 
tion declares "All men are born free and equal." The 



Constitution of the United States declares : " The citizens 
of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immu- 
nities of citizens in the several States." But the citizens 
of a part of Pennsylvania are not to be entitled to all the 
privileges conferred by this instrument upon the citizens 
of the other parts of the State. Of so much less con- 
sideration are the people of Philadelphia that it will re- 
quire 100,000 of them, when we are 800,000, to be ade- 
quate to have one Senator, while the other 3,200,000 
people, out of a population of four millions, will have 
forty-two Senators ; that is, every 73,785 will elect one 
Senator. Thus the people outside of this city are made 
politically, in respect to the Senate, more than twenty-six 
per cent, more valuable than the citizens of Philadelphia. 
JS T ow the Senate has the same power to tax the people as 
the House of Representatives ; and so far as the represen- 
tation in the Senate is made unequal so far is the principle 
of taxation without representation enforced — that bad 
principle which a British king tried to enforce, but against 
which our forefathers threw the tea that was to tax them 
into Boston harbor, and in resistance of which they 
achieved American independence. 

Say not that such assertion is an appeal to prejudice. It 
is the plain fact of history ; and those only can be insensible 
to the great wrong who are to gain by it, or who persuade 
themselves that they will have conpeusation in supposed 
advantages in the proposed Constitution. In my opinion 
no proffered advantages can compensate for a wrong so 
violative of the first and most fundamental principle of 
republican government. It can have no justification but 
that which upholds all despotisms — that of power without 
right. A majority of the Convention must have voted 
for it ; but that Convention was brought together upon 
contrivances that did not make them fairly represent the peo- 
ple ; but whatever the majority, or howsoever elected, 
nothing can justify the insertion of a provision in the 
Constitution so flagrantly wrong and unrepublican. Bet- 
ter had we endure existing evils for a time, and keep the 
door open for the formation of a Constitution that shall 
be worthy, both in principle and expediency, of the great 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

ELI K PRICE. 



SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED CONSTI- 
TUTION. 

No. 2. 

Article III prescribes limits to the powers of the Legis- 
lature. Its sections ordain how bills are to be considered ; 
how be passed and signed, and the yeas and nays be taken 
upon them ; and of all local and special bills previous no- 
tice must have been given. All these directions are good ; 
but suppose the legislators will not mind them, and their 
acts, without the prescribed obseLwances, duly appear 
upon the statute book, will not the courts enforce them as 
the law of the land ? They are not as a consequence of 
disobedience declared void. The courts are not author- 
ized to look behind the statute book and to declare them 
invalid because the directions of the Constitution have 
not been observed. Are they not then idle ? Will not 
they be laughed at when read in restraint of legislative 
action ? 

Sections 29, 30 and 31 prohibit bribery and corruption, 
and the guilty parties are to be punished by penalties to 
be prescribed by law ; but if the distrusted Legislature do 
not pass the law that is to punish them the guilty will 
not be punished. But that which is more important, if 
acts be passed by bribery and corruption, or other fraud, 
they are nevertheless to stand aud be enforced as laws, 
for they are not declared void, nor is there any method 
prescribed for ferreting out the fraud, nor any authority 
conferred upon the judiciary to declare the act void. And 
the 33d section makes it the duty of any member having 
an interest in a bill to be so candid as to tell his colleagues 
of it, and he is directed not to vote thereon. But sup- 
pose he be not so candid as to do so, or does vote, what 
then ? Nothing. The bill becomes a law. 

All the false and fraudulent bills that have ever been 
presented to the executive, passed or never passed by 
both or either house ; or that passed and had then been 
interpolated by a clerk, may continue to pass, and will 
find no elective provision in this Constitution to defeat 
the fraud. The convention has here intended wholesome 



reform, but has not provided the machinery to make their 
good intention effective. 

By " Section 17. No appropriation shall be made to any 
charitable or educational institution not under the abso- 
lute control of the commonwealth, other than normal 
schools established by law for the professional training of 
teachers for the public schools of the State, except by a 
vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each 
house." 

You read this with a hope that charitable and educa- 
tionable institutions may have some relief when private 
ability shall fail to supply the requisites means, by getting 
the vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to the 
two houses. You read the next section and that hope 
expires : 

" Section 18. No appropriations (except for pensions or 
gratuities for military services) shall be made for charita- 
ble, educational, or benevolent purposes, to any person or 
community, nor to any denominational or sectarian insti- 
tution, corporation or association." 

Strike out the exception for which only appropriation 
may be made, and the prohibition stands, " No appropria- 
tions shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent 
purposes to any person or community" What follows may 
be left out of view, for it has its own distinctive purpose, 
" nor to any denominational or sectarian institution, cor- 
poration or association." What then is left for the 17th 
section to operate upon, provided two-thirds of the mem- 
bers elected to the two houses wilL vote for it ? It is dif- 
ficult to say, and. the ambiguity must await judicial 
interpretation. Yet nothing should be written so plainly 
as a Constitution. What will be included in the words 
person and community is uncertain. In law corporations 
are persons. If natural person only was meant those words 
should have been used. You may give to a community by 
giving to its charitable or educational institutions, or to 
persons to be used in a community. Is that prohibited ? 
If so then nothing can be given under the 17th section. 
If by community the words city, county, borough or town- 
ship were meant, why were not those words used ? There 
would then have been some defi niteness of meaning. 

The prohibition is a distinct sentence : " No appropria- 



TIONS SHALL BE MADE FOR CHARITABLE, EDUCATIONAL, OR 
BENEVOLENT PURPOSES, TO ANY PERSON OR COMMUNITY." To 

the ordinary apprehension, and to the legal mind as well, 
these words appear to be totally prohibitive. Are the 
people of our State prepared for such prohibition, or even 
the risk of it ? If we accept them in our Constitution we 
can never hide them. We bind them on our foreheads to 
be seen of all people. " No appropriations shall be made 

POR CHARITABLE, EDUCATIONAL, OR BENEVOLENT PURPOSES." 

We will do this, too, while we are inviting all peoples and 
nations to come here to witness the evidences of our pro- 
gress in civilization and refinement! All charity may 
decay, the institutions of learning languish, and benevo- 
lence be exhausted of resources ; pestilence may sweep 
through the land, our cities be laid in ashes, yet the 
sovereignty of our great commonwealth, self-paralyzed by 
this Constitution, will be impotent to apply one dollar for 
the succor of her beneficent institutions, or the relief of a 
widely suffering humanity. The liberal deeds of other 
States may put her to shame, but in helpless sorrow she 
must endure her humiliation. We can be no longer proud 
of our good commonwealth when she shall be so stripped 
of her sovereignty, as to be disabled to do deeds of mercy 
and goodness. 

ELI K PRICE. 



SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED CONSTI- 
TUTION. 

No. 3. 

Article v, relates to the Judiciary. There is ample 
provision for the requisite number of judges, to be learned 
in the law. There is improvement in the creation of a 
separate Orphans' Court, and the suppression of the Regis- 
ter's Court. The four Courts of Common Pleas, with one 
Prothonotary's office, will be a convenience and saving 
of fees, in having but one office to search for the liens of 
judgments. One disadvantage, however, will be felt. 
The twelve judges must each, in order to perform his 
duty well, have to master too many branches of the law 



8 



Each must be prepared to try all civil causes in law and 
equity, now tried in the District Court and Common 
Pleas, all questions in the Orphans' Court, and also to 
hold the Court of Quarter Sessions, as well as try all 
grades of crime. A division of these jurisdictions would 
have made the judges of each court more perfect in the 
administration of its powers. 

It is ordained by ''Section 16. Whenever two judges 
of the Supreme Court are to be chosen for the same term 
of service, each voter shall vote for one only, and when 
three are to be chosen, he shall vote for no more than 
two ; candidates highest in vote shall be declared elected." 

The inferior magistrates are to be elected by the same 
plan. !Now let us, the electors, consider what is the import 
of this method of choosing judges. I admit that it is de- 
sirable to have judges on each bench of different political 
parties, that they may be a check on each other, and that 
the court may have the fullest confidence of the public. 
But are we to gain that result by disfranchising the citi- 
zen ; by really depriving him of any choice in the matter ? 
The fundamental and only republican rule is, that the ma- 
jority of votes shall decide all elections ; and that every 
electorial vote shall be as good as every other elector's 
vote. There must be party nominations of candidates to 
concentrate the votes and to make elections practicable. 

As yet no law regulates the manner of making nomi- 
nations, and in fact the citizens generally have no part in 
the work. It is all done by a few managing politicians ; 
and the electors have but the poor privileges of voting 
ior and against two nominees. To decide where the 
choice either way is a bad one is not much, it is true, 
but it is more than is permitted by the plan of this Con- 
stitution. Under it you have leave to cast your vote for 
your party's nominee, but you can cast no vote against 
the candidate of the opposing party. There is in fact no 
competition between them ; they are not running for the 
same office ; but each for a different seat. There is, in 
truth, no choice or election by the electors in the case. 
They but go through the form and show of election, for 
that was uetermined when the nomination was made. 
The members of the self-elected caucus were the mas- 
ters of the whole situation. They thereby became mas- 



ters of your votes, or made them valueless. They had 
already made the judges who are to decide upon all your 
dearest rights in this world — upon your rights of prop- 
erty, your rights of reputation and personal exemption 
from harm, your liberties, your life. In the serious busi- 
ness of the self-government of a people, and in the pro- 
tection of all human rights the most dear and sacred, 
there should be no room for fraud or circumvention — 
nothing shamming or that cheats the freeman of his 
greatest right, that which more than all else makes him 
feel the dignity of his manhood, of its sincerest signifi- 
cance and truest meaning. All this such plan of voting 
does ; disgusts the elector by the thought that he is put 
through so meaningless a performance, and brings repub- 
lican institutions into disfavor, and self-government by the 
people in question. Indeed republican institutions must 
fail if there be not reform in this matter, the evils of 
which this feature of the proposed Constitution greatly 
aggravates. There must be parties in a Republic; its 
true life consists in the earnest contests between them, 
and their contests for office should be a simple, earnest 
and honest strife by each to put its candidate in, and 
keep the opposing candidate out, so that each vote shall 
do a true and double service, of puttiug one in and keep- 
ing the other out. A virtual decision of the question by 
a nominating convention also immeasurably increases the 
temptation and opportunity for frauds. 

Tne great desideratum of all republicism is a plan of 
nomination of candidates for office in a manner that shall 
have legal sanction, and give equal opportunity to every 
elector and equal effect to every vote. It was hoped by 
some that the Convention would have consummated such 
an achievement, and have thereby earned the gratitude 
of all the true friends of free government. They made 
no such attempt, but have done that which, more than 
all else that could be attempted by any one professing 
republican principles, puts the science of self-government 
in peril of overthrow. 

ELI K. PRICE. 



10 



SOME OBJECTION'S TO THE PROPOSED CONSTI- 
TUTION. 



No. 4. 

We present to the consideration of our readers the fol- 
lowing reviews of the proposed Constitution, the first of 
them being the fourth article from the pen of Eli K. 
Price : 

Ed. Philada. Inquirer : — The Article ix. is upon taxa- 
tion and finance; 

"Section 1. All taxes shall be uniform upon the same 
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the au- 
thority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected 
under general laws ; but the General Assembly may, by 
general laws, exempt from taxation public property used 
for public purposes, actual places of religious worship, 
places of burial not used or held for private or corporate 
profit and institutions of purely public charity." 

If the first half of this section is to be executed in 
Philadelphia according to its literal reading, it will pro- 
duce great injustice and be a breach of public faith. The 
Legislature, representing the sovereignty of this Com- 
monwealth, when, in 1854, it incorporated the whole of 
the county of Philadelphia into one city, and, in order to 
conciliate and obtain the consent of the land owners in 
the rural parts, enacted " that the said City Councils shall 
so discriminate in laying said city taxes as not to impose 
upon the rural portions those expenses which belong ex- 
clusively to the built portions of the city." 

Section 3^. The supplement to the Consolidation act of 
1855, section 13, was in words more distinct and positive: 
" The Councils shall not impose taxes upon rural portions 
of the city for police and watchmen, for lighting and 
paving and cleaning streets, and shall make an allowance 
therefor of at least one-third of the whole city tax in 
favor of such section." And the rural township that 
composed the Twenty-first, Twenty-second and Twenty- 
third Wards were allowed to support their own poor as 
before (section 18), and be at the expense thereof. 

Now the electors of Pennsylvania are asked to remem- 



11 

ber that when this proposed Constitution shall receive the 
sanction of the majority of the votes cast, they will have 
established a new government, and that all prior laws are 
only saved by a clause in the new Constitution inserted 
for that purpose. It is in the schedule thus — " Section 2. 
All the laws in force in this Commonwealth at the time 
of the adoption of this Constitution, not inconsistent there- 
with, and all rights, actions, prosecutions and contracts 
shall continue as if this Constitution had not been adopted." 
Therefore, only law r s not inconsistent with this instru- 
ment can continue so have existence. But it requires 
that " all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of 
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority 
levying the tax." That authority is the city corporation, 
and its territory is all the county of Philadelphia. If 
there be any escape for the farmers not to pay the full 
city tax, including police, lighting, paving, and for the 
poor, it is not apparent in what is written, and will not 
be known until the Supreme Court shall decide the ques- 
tion ; yet the electors must blindly vote upon it within 
less than one month from their first chance to see the 
charter prepared for the new government. 

While, however, it will be a new government that is 
to spring into being by the votes of the people, it is the 
same sovereignty that exempted the citizens of the rural 
sections from the payment of taxes from which they can 
have no return of benefits. That sovereignty that was ob- 
viously just in its former discrimination, must now incur 
the reproach of the injustice of abolishing it. The third 
section of the Declaration of Rights ordains, that no man 
can of right be compelled to support any place of worship 
against his consent ; yet it appears that this same Consti- 
tution would compel many persons to pay taxes for light- 
ing, paving, cleaning and watching the streets, and pro- 
tecting the habitations of other people, as well as support 
their own poor, although no such benefit is received by 
them out of the taxes levied on them. Can the people 
anywhere wish to inflict such injustice ? 

The last half of section 1 restricts the Legislature very 
narrowly in its power of exempting property from taxa- 
tion, and so narrowly as to seem unwise. The only lati- 
tude given for exemption is " Public property used for 



12 



public purposes ; actual places of religious worship ; places 
of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit ; 
and institutions of purely public charity." And by sec- 
tion 2, " All laws exempting property from taxation, other 
than the property above enumerated, shall be void." 
Heretofore there has been exempted by general laws, 
burial grounds, universities, colleges, academies, school 
house?, endowed or established by law ; court houses and 
jails, with the improvements and five acres of land at- 
tached, but all their property producing income was and 
is subject to taxation. Yet many of these places of edu- 
cation were using their income for purposes as good as 
these for which the taxes collected are expended. In such 
cases the collection of the tax is worse than useless. 

]STow such institutions must be erected and sustained by 
private liberality ; and private liberality must raise and 
pay the taxes also ; taxes, when collected, to be used for 
purposes no better, and often wastefully. Other govern- 
ments, in this and other countries, establish and maintain 
their places of learning and schools of science and the arts, 
but ours is, by the j)roposed Constitution, compelled to tax 
them. Is all this intended to be in the progress of civili- 
zation ? It is, in iact, a retrograde movement from civili- 
zation ; is to obstruct our progress in the useful arts, in 
science, wealth, civilized culture and religion ! I speak 
well advised when I say our movement is a retrograde 
one. In our Constitution of 1776, framed when our 
forefathers were in the glow of revolutionary patriotism, 
and Franklin exercised a prevailing influence (Chap. ii. 
Sec. 44), declared that besides common schools, " All use- 
ful learning shall be duly encouraged and promoted in 
one or more universities," and while that Constitution 
was in force the University of Pennsylvania received large 
donations from the State ; and tbe Constitution of 1790, 
while the great men of the revolution yet lived, ordained 
that u The arts and sciences shall be promoted in one or 
more seminaries of learning (article viii, section 2). These 
things the Legislature were to see accomplished by govern- 
mental aid. Now the Legislature is forbidden to aid them, 
and is required to tax them. 

But what are " purely public charities " which may 
escape taxation ? This is quite as much unknown to 



13 

lawyers as to any other electors. They are not, I appre- 
hend, the Girard College, Wills' Hospital, or any of our 
hospitals, dispensaries, orphans' or widows' asylums ; cer- 
tainly not the universities. I know not what they will 
be, nor who can teli me, except it be the Supreme Court 
at some future day. In the meantime we must vote in 
the dark. 

ELI K PRICE. 



SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED CONSTI- 
TUTION. 

No. 5. 

The 11th Section of the IXth Aricle provides a sinking 
fund for the redemption of the State debt. "The said 
sinking fund shall consist of the proceeds of the sales of 
the public works or any part thereof, and of the income 
or proceeds of the sales of any stocks owned by the com- 
monwealth ; together with other funds and resources that 
may be designated by law, and shall be increased from 
time to time by assigning to it any part of the taxes or other 
revenues of the State not required for the ordinary and current 
expenses of government ; and unless in case of war, inva- 
sion or insurrection, no part of the said sinking fund shall 
be used or applied otherwise than in the extinguishment 
of the public debt." 

" Section 12. The moneys of the State, over and above 
the necessary reserve, shall be used in the payment of the 
debt of the State, either directly or through the sinking 
fund, and the moneys of the sinking fund shall never be 
invested in or loaned upon the security of anything except 
the bonds of the United States or of this State." 

" Section 13. The moneys held as necessary reserve shall 
be limited by law to the amount required for current ex- 
penses, and shall be secured and kept as may be provided 
bylaw.'; 

Reading the three sections together we find that " the 
moneys held as necessary reserve shall be limited by law 
to the amount required for current expenses ; " that " the 
moneys of the State, over and above the necesary reserve, 



14 

shall be used in the payment of the debt of the State, 
either directly or through the sinking fund." And then 
the sinking fund Ci shall be increased from time to time 
by assigning to it any part of the taxes or other revenues 
of the State not required for the ordinary and current ex- 
penses of the government." Thus all the taxes and reve- 
nues of the State are inexorably devoted to the ordinary 
and current expenses of the government, and to the sink- 
ing fund ; and unless in case of war, invasion or insurrec- 
tion, nothing can go out of the sinking fund but to pay 
the State debt. Of consequence no moneys of the State 
can ever be applied to any purpose of chanty, education, 
or benevolence, denominational or otherwise, and, of 
course, to no Centennial, or other exhibition or Memorial 
hall, or to develop our resources, or to gratify or instruct the 
people. The State at her capital may have no park ; no hall 
to exhibit the products of her mines and manufactories ; 
no geological survey to develop our minerals; no ceme- 
tery to bury the soldiers who have fallen in the defence 
of their country ; may establish no asylum for their widows 
or orphans, but may only aid institutions established by 
others for them (Section 19 of Article III.) The State 
debt may be paid off*, and the prohibitions will remain all 
the same in the Constitution. 

Surely but few of the members of the Convention can 
have considered of these consequences. Some of them 
surely have, or these clauses would not have been in it. 
Now read in connection with them the second section of 
the schedule, continuing in force under the new govern- 
ment, only the laws not inconsistent with this proposed con- 
stitution. The moment it shall be adopted all laws incon- 
sistent with it will be repealed. How many they will be 
no one can now foresee ; but they will be many, and give 
work to the judiciary for years to come. 

I deeply regret to speak of what I am about to say ; to 
dampen the ardor of our people and alarm their cherished 
hopes and patriotism in respect to their preparations for 
the great Centennial Exhibition of 1876 ; but we had 
better look to the consequences before we vote for a Con- 
stitution that must extinquish our dearest aspirations for 
this city, State and nation ; so far as our State is to have 
part in it, and derive a glory in the good it is to do, in 



15 

that great measure of education and material develop- 
ment, and more than all besides calculated to make our 
States a united people. By an act of the Legislature of 
Pennsylvania, passed the 27th day of March, 1873, it 
was enacted, '• That the sum of one million of dollars be 
and the same is hereby appropriated for the erection of a 
permanent Centennial Exposition building for the people 
of this Commonwealth, and for the use of the Centennial 
Anniversary of American Independence, under the direc- 
tion of the United States Centennial Board of Finance, 
incorporated by Act of Congress," the said hall to be 
erected in Fairmount Park. No part of this money has 
been paid to the Centennial Board of Finance. The State 
Treasury is pledged for but one-fourth of that sum, and 
three-fourths are to be raised by taxing the street passen- 
ger railway companies of Philadelphia ; and if so raised, 
an appropriation may be requisite by the next Legisla- 
ture, which it would not have power to make after the 
adoption of the Constitution now proposed. It would 
be a law inconsistent with the restrictions of the Consti- 
tution. Again, the existing law of March last would not 
be continued in force by the second section of the schedule, 
because a State tax on the Philadelphia passenger railway 
companies, not including all other such companies in the 
Commonwealth, would directly conflict with the first sec- 
tion of Article ix : " All taxes shall be uniform upon the 
same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax." No part of this tax has been 
raised, and its validity is the subject of pending litigation. 
And still again, the appropriation of one-half million of 
dollars by the State hangs upon the appropriation by the 
city of Philadelphia to the same object. This appropriation 
has been made by the City Councils, but has not been 
paid to the Centennial Board of Finance. Suppose this 
Constitution to be in force on the first day of January 
next, repealing all laws inconsistent with it. Then section 
7 of article ix will stand prohibitive against the General 
Assembly authorizing any city appropriating any money 
to any corporation, association, institution, or individual. 
It will be a question for the judiciary to determine whether 
that part of the law will stand as consistent with the new 
Constitution or not. In the absence of all decision I can- 



16 

not say that my opinion on the question would be better 
than that of anybody else ; but I know well that there is 
enough of question about it to distress me, for I should 
very much dislike to have the question raised against the 
Centennial Board. It would be most unfortunate, after 
our most impressive solemnities of last Fourth of July, if 
by this new obstacle we should be crippled in our resour- 
ces to meet the expectations we have raised in our sister 
States and all the world. 

Let us here pause for a moment to contemplate the 
character of the government we are about to create in 
such haste, before one in a thousand of the electors can 
Well understand it. In thinking of it I cannot but fear 
we shall never again look upon our State as capable of 
being personified as a kindly protectress ; as a mother 
who loved and cherished her children. I feel that if we 
shall still share her regards and affections it must be as 
those of one who, fettered and powerless, will look upon 
us in sorrow as made helpless to do us good, in all those 
respects that most conduce to human welfare and happi- 
ness. To my view the makers of the Constitution have 
endeavored to invest her with all the characteristics of a 
miser. She is to give nothing to charity, learning, or 
benevolence; and the charity of her citizens, their schools 
of science and learning ; their endowments, and those of 
religion, she will tax; will abstract their means for pur- 
poses no better, often not as good, as the objects to which 
they had been devoted by private benevolence. She can 
never come up to a standard equal to that of her good 
private citizens. In that she is humiliated ; and all her 
people are made to share in that humiliation. It is the 
glorious characteristic of all our States and cities that if 
one part be afflicted by a great calamity all others are 
prompt aud generous in affording relief. But our State 
may not hereafter indulge in the deeds of humanity ; for 
she may do no deed of charity or benevolence "to any 
person or community " (article ii, section 18) ; she may 
only pay her debt and the " ordinary and current expenses 
of government " (article ix, sections 11, 12, 13) ; nor shall 
her General Assembly allow any county, city, or borough 
to appropriate any money to any corporation, association, 
institution, or individual " (article ix, section 7). If a 



17 

citizen were thus selfishly to sheath himself from perform- 
ing all social and humane duties toward his fellow-men he 
would justly be loathed and hated of mankind. I say, 
again, Grd save us ; for if we cannot give to others in 
their suffering we may not expect their good gifts in the 
times of our afflictions. 

ELI K. PRICE. 



SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED CONSTI 

TUTIOK 

No. 6. 

The subject of special hostility by this Constitution 
appears to be legislative exemptions of taxation, which I 
hope I have shown to be groundless, to special and frau- 
dulent legislation, as to which I am not at issue with the 
Convention, though many of the bad bills I believe to be 
the work of clerks and not of members, and to corpora- 
tions, and these have committed sins justly incurring cen- 
sure. The railroads are chiefly the corporations dealt 
with by the instrument in question, and some salutary re- 
straints are put upon them, which may in part be effective, 
and in part may not. Article xvi, section 6, restricts cor- 
porations to their expressly authorized business, and to 
that the Supreme Court has always held them. Section 
5, subjects them to cumulative voting. That may be of 
doubtful expediency. As in the political field it is to 
enable a minority to have a representation, and that 
minority may put offensive, elements into the manage- 
ment not compatible with its welfare. 

Ordinarily, less than half the stock votes will be cast, 
and those cast will be usually for one of two opposing 
tickets, when the highest numbers may not exceed one- 
fourth of the whole vote. One, two, or a few of the 
largest shareholders, watching the course of voting, if not 
strong enough to defeat the whole strongest ticket, will 
then concentrate their votes on just so many candidates as 
they can carry ; perhaps enough to make a majority ; if 
not, they will have a minority representation. They will 
have the advantage of all the absentees to increase their 
representatives in the board. Stock may be suddenly 



18 

bought for the purpose of capsizing the management, and 
may prove successtul when little expected, and the oppor- 
tunity seized for plunder. I may here say of the cumula- 
tive system and minorit}'- representation, introduced in 
several places in this new project of a Constitution, is the 
idea of Thomas Hare, Esq., of London, and was supported 
by John Stuart Mill, but did not in Eugland find favor 
w r ith the practical statesmen, with the exception of some 
" triangular elections," or voting for two in three candi- 
dates. The best reformer in England, and one of the 
purest Liberal statesmen of this age — John Bright — lately 
denounced it as the worst electoral contrivance which has 
ever been devised. — {Saturday Review, November 1st, 1873, 
p. 571.) 

Every departure from the republican principle that the 
majority shall rule and take the responsibility of ruling, 
with the risk of losing power by the abuse of power, is to 
incur weakness ; is to disfranchise the electors ; is to allow 
caucuses to usurp the franchise of the freemen. It is a 
latal concession for any majority to make. The majority 
represents the voice or the people when moved to sustain 
any great policy or measure of the people. And what is 
the value of a majority if a minority of able men are 
allowed to rule a Congress, a Legislature, or Convention. 
Just so President Grant's first term was hampered by its 
enemies ; just so this Constitutional Convention has been 
influenced, and, if Congress had been so weakened in its 
measures by a minority of one-third of the men of ability 
who opposed the war, the rebellion could have never been 
put down. But should we overlook all the good corpora- 
tions have done for us — the banks, the insurance com- 
panies, the turnpike, canal and railroad companies, the 
colleges, universities, churches ? They have been the life 
of our material prosperity, and created and preserved our 
scientific, educational, moral and religious standing, and 
made it what it is. 

The former framers of Constitutions were careful to 
preserve their rights inviolate. That of 1776 ordained 
that " All religious societies or bodies of men heretofore 
united or incorporated for the advancement of religion or 
learning, or for other pious or charitable purposes, shall 
be encouraged and protected in the enjoyment of the 



19 

privileges, immunities, and estates which they are accus- 
tomed to enjoy, or could of right enjoy under the laws 
and former Constitution of this State." (Chap, i, sec. 45.) 
That of 1790 ordained that " The rights, privileges, im- 
munities and estates of religious societies and corporate 
bodies shall remain as if the Constitution of this State 
had not been altered or amended." (Art. vii, sec. 3.) How 
conservative of vested rights, how just toward the men 
of enterprise, science and religion, were those political 
fathers of our Republic, whose appended names their de- 
scendants love to read, and feel to share their honor as they 
read tthm, and whom we all love to hold in honor. 

In the instrument now under consideration I find no 
special clause to save the rights and privileges of corpora- 
tions of any kind, nor the vested rights of shareholders 
in them. The spirit of the thirteen sections of article 
xvi is hostile to all corporations. All existing charters 
not yet bona fide organized are declared void. (Section 1.) 
The General Assembly is forbidden to remit the forfeiture 
of any charter, except they be made subject to the pro- 
visions of this Constitution. (Section 2.) Their property 
is made subject to eudless repetitions of taxation for pub- 
lic use. (Section 3.) All elections for directors are sub- 
jected to cumulative voting. (Section 4.) Section 5, 6 and 
8 are law now. The General Assembly may alter or 
annul charters now revocable by law or hereafter created, 
doing no injustice to corporators. (Section 10.) 

Article xvii relates to railroads and canals. Its pro- 
visions are somewhat restrictive, but may not prove so 
unfriendly as may have been expected. " Any associa- 
tion or corporation, organized for the purpose, shall have 
the right to construct and operate a railroad between any two 
points within this State, and to connect at the State line 
with railroads of other States." (Section 1.) 

This, indeed, is an extraordinary privilege ; connected 
with the right secured by the previous article to take 
any other railroad or canal by the power of eminent do- 
main. It may not indeed, by the fourth section, consoli- 
date with or control any other railroad or canal corpora- 
tion, whose work is parallel or competing ; but what 
signifies such inhibition when any railroad company so 
authorized by the Legislature may construct their tracks 



20 

and run their locomotives from the Pennsylvania railroad 
terminus west of the Schuylkill, down Market street to 
the Delaware avenue, and down Broad street to League 
Island. Surely the Legislature, though bound by many 
withes of restriction, and the members, by an iron-clad 
oath, even with a fettered railroad corporation, may do 
great things within the limits of this new Constitution. 

The little horse railroad companies may not by section 
9 construct any railway within the limits of any city 
without the consent of the local authority, but any rail- 
road big enough may buy by the valuation of a jury any 
kind of a railroad, or go where there is no railroad with- 
out the consent of the local authority, and drive their 
steam locomotives through the streets of any city in the 
State. They <c shall have the ri^ht to construct and 
operate a railroad between any two points within this 
State.'' It may intersect with any other railroad within 
the State or at the State line ; to do which should be 
profitable to them. Everybody and all property may be 
transported over them, and that should be profitable, 
but the company must not unreasonably discriminate in 
charges, nor should they be unreasonable if they want to 
do a profitable business. There is here a beautiful accord 
between the prescribed rule and the interest of the com- 
pany ; and there is something more beautiful in it a beau- 
tiful simplicity. The company, of course, is the only 
judge of what is reasonable or unreasonable discrimina- 
tion. 

Then read on in the third section, and there is more 
charming simplicity : — " Persons and property transported 
over any railroad shall be delivered at any station at 
charges not exceeding the charges for transportation of 
persons and property of the same class in the same direc- 
tion to any more distant station." That is to say, the 
company must charge persons and property no more for a 
short than a long distance ; that is, no more for a small 
service than a greater one. That seems very reasonable, 
and any carrying company would be unreasonable to com- 
plain of it. If it had said that the company should charge 
no more for a short distance than the proportionate part 
of the charge for a through trip, there would have been 
more point or purpose in the sentence, and, perhaps, great 



21 

severity and impolicy in it, as that would have serious^ 
damaged the company in competing for distant through 
traffic, which it can only induce by cheapness. Section 5 
is quite an iron band of constriction upon transporting 
companies. They may not mine or manufacture articles 
to keep their transportation, or engage in other business 
than that of common carriers, nor hold lands, except such 
as are necessary for their carrying business. 

And such has been the law, except where there has 
been express authority to do more. Yet I suppose com- 
mon carriers might construct their own locomotives, cars 
and boats. And I suppose friendly mining or manufac- 
turing companies might own lands and manufactories, 
and operate them, and transport by the most convenient 
railroad or canal, and the stockholders might be the same, 
or much the same, as those of the transporting company ; 
or the latter might lend moneys to their mining and manu- 
facturing customers, and thereby increase products for 
transportation. This section may, therefore, be quite 
harmless. 

Next read Section 8 : — " No railroad, railway or other 
transportation company shall grant free passes or passes 
at a discount to any persons except officers or employees 
of the company." Truly no railway company will justly 
compkin of this section. Nothing could be more politic, 
just or wise, and it is to be hoped that they will obey it 
without exception other than above expressed and to 
send the poor to their homes, and the ministers to preach 
the Gospel. If they should do so it ought of itself to 
make a good dividend for the shareholders. But if they 
should wilfully disobey what is enjoined upon them, I do 
not see any penalty inflicted. It may be expected, how- 
ever, that when the members of the Legislature shall get 
no free passes, they may deal less tenderly with the rail- 
road companies. Hence the ordination of section 12 : — 
" The General Assembly shall enforce by appropriate 
legislation the provisions of this article." Yes, even the 
Legislators are trusted to deal with their old corrupters, 
although they have been themselves laced in straight 
jackets and proclaimed to the world as untrustworthy. 
.But then they have been made to take a hard oath, and 
this section says, "Shall enforce by appropriate legislation 
th« provisions of this article." 



22 

But suppose they don't do so ; why, then they don't, 
and there's the end of it. We find repeated instances in 
this instrument of a practical wisdom that is not new, 
but of which there was an illustration in the time of 
Queen Elizabeth : — Watchman — " How if a man will not 
stay ?" Dogberry. — " Why, then take no note of him, but 
let him go." We may not overlook the fact in a republi- 
can government that they who are to exercise the sovereign 
power of making laws to meet the needs of the State must 
be vested with large authority. If they abuse it the reme- 
dies are three — the free press and public opinion, frequent 
elections, the power of the judiciary. The first never 
sleeps, the second is impaired by this instrument, the last 
is not clothed with the requisite power to apply the reme- 
dies. Now no one has more grieved over some things the 
railroad companies have done than I have, especially in 
procuring legislation, and though when in the Senate I 
would not accept their free tickets, 1 am not willing to 
forget the great public benefits of their works, for which 
we should treat them as friends and not enemies. 

All the successful internal improvements of this country 
have been made in my day ; the Lancaster and Pittsburg 
turnpikes in my infancy ; the National road and all the 
canals and railroads since the beginning of my manhood, 
and their progress, and the consequent development of the 
whole country under their benign influences, has been to 
me an incessant source of pleasure, ever increasing with 
the number of my years, but to go on increasing, and not 
to culminate in their greatness for ages and centuries to 
come. I have never received a favor from one of them ; 
yet, as the City of Philadelphia has been largely developed 
by them, and the coal regions made accessible by them, 
they have for me, as well as for all others, added value to 
my investments, and have my gratitude. Who can step 
into a Pennsylvania car at Jersey City, lettered with the 
name of our beloved State, and not feel a pride that he 
may be transported thence in a palace car to the remotest 
South and farthest West with the ease and comfort of his 
home life, yet charmed by the scenery of every variety of 
country — agricultural, with rolling surface, or the wide 
prairie, and the rivers and mountains, until he shall be- 
hold the Pacific ? 

ELI K PRICE. 



23 



SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED CONSTI- 
TUTION. 

No. 7. 

The Constitution of 1776 declared a principle that 
should have lived to this day and forever. It was thus 
therein declared : " As representation in proportion to the 
number of taxable inhabitants is the only principle which can 
at all times secure liberty, and make the voice of a majority of 
the people the law of the land ; therefore, the General As- 
sembly shall cause complete lists of the taxable inhabitants 
in the city and each county of the commonwealth, respec- 
tively to be taken and returned to them," &c. (Sect. 17.) 
The Constitution of 1790 placed no other restriction than 
this : that no city nor county should be divided in form- 
ing a district, and that the districts should be so formed 
as to be entitled to no more than foar senators. The 
number of representatives were to be not less than sixty 
nor more than one hundred, and the senators were to be 
not less than one- fourth nor more than one-third the num- 
ber of the representatives. Between these limits the Assem- 
bly was to fix the number of each. There was no compulsion 
to give the city a disproportion in the Senate. In 1790 the 
State's population was 434,373 ; that of our city of two 
square miles, 28,522 ; the proportionate constituency of 33 
senators, 13,163. So the city could have no more than 
two senators. In 1840 the State's population was 1,724,- 
033, that of our city 93,655, the proportionate constitu- 
ency for 33 senators 52,243 ; so that we had then no claim 
to more than two senators ; so that neither convention 
intended the city any disfranchisement. But on the 2d 
of February, 1854, our city was extended over an area of 
122 square miles by the act of consolidation. In 1850 the 
State's population was 2,311,786, the proportionate con- 
stituency of 33 senators was 70,031 ; but our enlarged 
city's population became in 1854, by the preceedmg Fed- 
eral census, 409,045, showing then a basis for nearly six 
senators. There was, therefore, no bad precedent attorded 
by any previous Constitutional Convention. The disparity 
came by the consolidation act, whose friends never doubted 



24 

that justice would be done the enlarged city at the first 
amendment of the State Constitution. 

Now let us see how groundless was our just expectation. 
In the winter of 1856 Mr. Buckalew introduced into the 
Senate his amendments, which became, after modification, 
part of the Constitution in 1857. He well knew our de- 
ficient representation in the Senate, as a consequence of the 
new city charter embracing so large a population, and he 
and the majority would listen to no change in this re- 
spect by the city's senators — then Crabb and Price, and 
the county's — then Brown, Ingraham and Pratt. Nay, 
the bill had in it this clause: "But no city shall be 

ALLOWED MORE THAN FIFTEEN REPRESENTATIVES." That 

meant only Philadelphia ; and that she should then be 
shorn not only of one-third of her rightful number of 
senators, but also of any increase of representatives in the 
house for her disproportion of increase forever thereafter. 
This proposed clause was defeated. I made a speech 
against it, then printed and now before me. The argu- 
ment then used by Mr. Buckalew in support of this limi- 
tation, as I well remember, was that Philadelphia con- 
tained many colored people and foreigners not entitled to 
vote. Yet the basis of representation at that time was 
taxables and not population, and many colored persons and 
foreigners were taxable for the property they held. But 
even that reason could aiibrd little pretext for a reduced 
representation in 1873, when colored citizens have the 
same rights as white men, and foreigners not entitled to 
vote abound in the mining and manufacturing districts 
out of this city, in as large proportion as in it. But why 
base the Constitution on a conjecture, when representation 
is required to be equal? Answer: Only because there 
was the power and a willingness to use it. 

1 know of no example of such injustice except in the 
enlightened and progressive State of Delaware, still dis- 
tinguished by the use of the whipping post. Their Con- 
stitution gave to each of her three counties s^even repre*- 
sentatives, which the Legislature, by two-thirds of each 
branch, might alter ; but the fourteen representatives 
from Kent and Sussex, and two-thirds of the Senate, will 
never allow JSTew Castle, though increased to half the 
whole population, to have more than seven representa- 



25 

tives ! Of course such a Legislature will not enact a law 
to provide for a better constitution ; nothing but a revo- 
lution can restore the people to their rights. 

I think it most probable that no member of the Con- 
vention ever knew, or if they did ever know, failed to 
remember, except Mr. Buckalew, the history of the acci- 
dental manner by which the Constitution became restric- 
tive upon the Senatorial representation of Philadelphia, 
wben no previous convention, as things stood at the time, 
could have expected the disfranchisement of the citizens 
of any city. They only thought of cities as they existed 
at the time. But the members of this Convention, for 
the first time, have directly met and decided to disfran- 
chise a large proportion of the electors of Philadelphia, 
amounting, if taken by the population of 1870, to 11U,543 
citizens unrepresented in the Senate. Ihis reproach they 
must bear in history, whose justice will withhold no just 
censure. 

My friend, Mr. Broomall, and the esteemed editor of 
the Public Ledger, seem to think that we should accept 
the proposed Constitution because the new retains only 
half the wrong of the old, which they both denounce as 
unjust — the Public Ledger as " monstrous injustice" — and 
they both accept the new as a step toward reparation of 
the wrong ; the Public Ledger even calls it " a long stride 
toward setting that wrong right." Let us see now if 
that be quite accurate. Four out of thirty-three Senators 
is 12.12 per cent, of Senatorial representation. Eight out 
of fifty Senators is 16 per cent, of that representation ; 
while the city's population of 1870 of 674,022 in the 
State's population of 3,521,701 entitles us to 19.42 per 
cent, of the representation in question. This long stride 
is, therefore, but a half-way step toward the remission of 
the wrong done to the city's electors. Will the Public 
Ledger be kind enough to set this correction before its 
many readers, whom I desire much to reach. 

Some persons, not close in calculation, take the idea 
that as we are to have eight Senators we shall be twice 
as well off as before, forgetting that the Senate is diluted 
by having fifty instead of thirty-three ; whereas the gain 
is little over one, or five in thirty-three, which would give 
the city a representation in the Senate of 18.18 per cent., 



26 

when we are entitled to 19.42 per cent., or nearly one-fifth 
of the whole. 

I have given the history of this " monstrous injustice," 
to satisfy the excellent editor of the Public Ledger and 
the public also, that from my opportunities and most 
anxious consideration of the subject, I was the most un- 
likely of my fellow-citizens to "overlook the gross injus- 
tice of the present Constitution ;" for I could not con- 
sider that the greater wrong could be any justification or 
apology of the great wrong attempted to be perpetrated 
and perpetuated in the new Constitution. No foimer 
Convention, or the people, had directly voted upon the 
matter ; now the people are asked to vote upon it with 
no proper opportunity of information ; while more than 
half the editors of the State preclude them from the 
knowledge requisite to intelligent voting, by refusing to 
let them have the views opposed to their own. Is this just 
toward their subscribers ? These might like to judge for 
themselves. 

But are we justified in sanctioning a great wrong and 
outrage; flagrant treason to republican principles, be- 
cause the injustice is made only half as great as it has 
been ? "We have no right so to compromise so sacred a 
principle. We had better endure our present injustice 
until our fellew-citizens shall lift from us the heel of op- 
pression. 

ELI K PRICE. 



SOME OBJECTION'S TO THE PROPOSED CONSTI- 
TUTION. 

No. 8. 

I desire to bring these, to me unpleasant criticisms, to a 
close. I intended to expose only the principal and most 
unbearable provisions. Others have noticed several objec- 
tions which I have not, that I might not be too tedious. 
I have been asked by " Elector," through The Inquirer, 
for my views as to the new magistrates to be elected for 
Philadelphia (article v, section 12). I am not surprised 
at the desire of the convention to get rid of aldermen com- 



27 

pensated by fees, since in numerous instances that system 
led to great abuse and oppression. The mode of election 
of the new magistrates is obnoxious to the strictures made 
as to the method of electing judges of the Supreme Court. 
It is a substantial disfranchisement of the electors, and a 
substitution for them of electoral boards to consist of poli- 
ticians who can be named delegates in their several wards, 
without any legally prescribed plan or qualification. Thus 
for want of fitting prescription of law lawless men may 
make their own judges in defiance of the popular vote. 
They of course will expect favors from judges of their own 
creation. It is this lower class of judges with those of 
the Supreme Court who are to be elected by voting only 
for one when two are candidates, and for two when there 
are three candidates. But, if the principle was deemed 
good, why was it not applied to the judges of the Common 
Pleas ? 

I have been treating of commissions rather than omis- 
sions. I now say that large cities needed a protection not 
found in this instrument. It is truly a large protection 
that no local or special act can be passed incorporating 
cities u or changing their charters." (Article ii, section 7.) 
But the citizens of no city have received any protection 
from the evils of bribery, corruption and fraud. The con- 
vention has sought diligently to throw guards around the 
Legislature. (Article iii.) Bribery and corruption are for- 
bidden. (Sections 29, 30.) Truly, acts may be passed of 
that nature to forbid such offences, but will they be ? 
(Section 31.) But why should cities not have had directly 
the benefits of sections 29, 30 and 31, and yet more im- 
portant, of section 32, which compels witnesses to testify 
in such cases ? We should then not witness the discredit- 
able scenes we are often compelled to see, when committees 
of Councils attempt to purge themselves, by guilty wit- 
nesses setting them at defiance. And over such crimes 
there should have been extended an ample judicial power 
to investigate, try and punish the criminals, of course with 
power to commit refusing witnesses for contempt. Of this 
necessity the convention was amply warned. They have 
left us as helpless of remedy as before, and thus have 
virtually deferred to and perpetuated the municipal rings 
and permitted public plunder to flourish. 



28 

The members of the convention seem not to have known 
or to have forgotten our municipal experience for the past 
twenty years. Those who framed the consolidation act 
in 1853, relied more upon the popular virtue than the city 
politicians here justified. They made elective by the peo- 
ple the Board of Health, the Prison Inspectors, the Guar- 
dians of the Poor, the School Directors. The care of 
Girard College and other trusts fell, by the wills of the 
testators, under the city's control. The management of 
the city departments by ward politicians became so grossly 
corrupt and foul as to be called the " buzzards' nests." 
The body of the people revolted at the development, 
and sought and found relief in the Legislature. In 1859 
the Board of Guardians of the Poor was abolished, and 
its members were made appointable, three by each of the 
Courts of Common Pleas, District Court and Supreme 
Court, and three by the City Councils. The Board of 
Health was abolished, and the future members were to be 
appointed in the same manner. The appointees were all to 
be " respectable citizens." The appointment of the Prison 
Inspectors had, in 1856, been placed, five in the Supreme 
Court, three in the District, and three in the Common 
Pleas. And on the 30th of June, 1869, the Legislature 
passed an act authorizing the judges of the Supreme 
Court, District Court and Court of Common. Pleas to form 
a board to appoint trustees of the Girard and other es- 
tates held in trust by the city for charities. 

But now we are to be shorn somewhat of this protec- 
tion ; never sought or desired by any of the judges, but 
found necessary to preserve our citizens from some of such 
gigantic plunder as New York has s uttered. The 21st 
Section of Article v ordains, " ]STo duties shall be imposed 
by law upon the Supreme Court or any of the judges 
thereof, except such as are judicial ; nor shall any of the 
judges thereof exercise any power of appointment except 
as herein provided." 

The proposed Constitution seems not to have abolished 
these and other commissions. On the contrary Article xv 
Section 2, recognizes their continued existence. But no 
power is designated for filling vacanies in their boards, 
and, so far as it shall not be judicial, it must be political. 



29 

But no local or special act can now avail for our relief. 
(Article ii, Section 7.) 

But several questions now arise which would have been 
avoided if the proposed instrument had been more ex- 
plicit. The judges of the three courts now constitute the 
board of appointment of trustees of the city trusts, and 
the judges of the other courts than the Supreme do not 
alone constitute that board, nor are they alone authorized 
to fill vacancies. The difficulty is the same as to the 
Boards of Guardians of the Poor, the Prison Inspectors 
and the Health Department, as to which the courts act 
separately, so although the judges of the Court of Com- 
mon Pleas and District Court, are not forbidden to ap- 
point, where the power was in them, or either of them, 
exclusively ; their power where there was to be joint ac- 
tion with the Supreme Court, or its judges, seems to have 
been lost. Where the power was in the Common Pleas 
and District Court, as their jurisdiction is preserved to 
the Common Pleas, the power of appointment probably 
remains. 

JSTow conceive, if you can, what will be the result. 
With the terrible expositions we have had in New York, 
without any apparent deterring influence here, and with 
the conviction and condign punishment there of the 
arch traitor to public trusts, yet striking no terror here, 
we have no ground for hope that things will be better 
here than they were in our worst days of municipal abuses. 
What we see done in departments not under judicial ap- 
pointment, should satisfy us that all which may fall under 
political appointment will suffer a like relapse. Here in 
this city more than half the property of the Common- 
wealth is owned, here reside one-fifth of her population, 
and here, where political power is most liable to abuse, 
we are, by a few imperative lines, deprived of the most 
reliable protection we had, and that without any enlarge- 
ment of judicial remedy. The convention could not have 
been ignorant of this peril to us, else why were the elec- 
toral officers of our city, exceptionally to all others in the 
State, denied the right to take the vote upon the Consti- 
tution ? Was it not because the convention distrusted 
the honesty of our city officials ? It could have been 
nothing else. 



30 

No intelligent citizen doubts that some members of 
Councils are in some way interested in the sale of materials 
furnished, or in the price of work done for the city. It is 
believed very generally that no street is graded or paved, 
no bridge or school house is built, no sewer constructed, 
by municipal authority, without the levy of a heavy per- 
centage for Councilmen ; but, for want of proper consti- 
tutional or legislative provision, there is no adequate 
remedy to expose and punish the crime ; and the older 
members of Councils will tell you that this wrong is ever 
on the increase. "Whence, then, can come our deliver- 
ance, if not from the honest yeomanry of our country 
and the substantial citizen of the interior? There has 
always been my reliance in our extremity ; as it was in 
the periods of our riots ; but in this instance I have been 
wofully disappointed. All the imputations here made 
must be taken with many honorable exceptions in Coun- 
cils, to whom the citizens owe praise and gratitude. 

It is said on the part of the advocates of the new Con- 
stitution that it is not of the honorable that it encoun- 
ters opposition, but of such men a3 belong to or proiit by 
rings. The latter do not lack the instinct to scent their 
own interest, nor the sagacity to perceive where the door3 
will be opened for admission to plunder. It would be 
most unnatural that they should oppose the presentation 
of the opportunities they most desire. The proof is de- 
manded. The fact is, there is an awful silence prevailing 
in view of issues so stupendous, a silence that portends 
danger to the city and State, but especially to the city. 
It seems too much to expect of our citizens that they 
should read, study and digest so long an instrument, lull 
of new provisions, in half a month. I have heard one 
very intelligent citizen, who aitempted the task, say that 
it would take a John Marshall many months to master its 
comprehension in all its bearings. 

Here I propose to close these numbers. Less than I 
have done I was not at liberty to omit doing. I have 
been told by the confident of success to "stand from 
under," meaning that the vote of the people would drive 
this new Constitution as an avalanche over us, and then 
its opponents would suffer. Politically, the threat has no 
significance for me. If I suffer, as I expect to suffer, I 



31 

will but suffer with my fellow-citizens ; but then I will 
not suffer as one without hope, for it is in the wisdom of 
Providence that evil has ever its mission of reform. Such 
good I expect to come from a brief trial of this Constitu- 
tion. So much one of its signers has said to me. Instead 
ot aiming to be on the successful side, if the vote shall 
carry the Constitution, I much the more desire in that 
event to have recorded my protest against it. In age the 
sense of duty becomes of more paramount importance. 
What are a few temporal advantages compared to peace 
of mind — a peace that can only be had by obedience to a 
sense to duty. " Woe is me" if I do not obey it ! In a 
few fleeting years the places that now know me shall 
know me no more forever ; but the example and warnings 
I shall leave may be of some value in the future. I have 
had much to do with the legislation of this State, and 
especially that relating to this city. Three years I spent 
in the Senate to carry, secure and perfect the city's char- 
ter. Nothing can be more painful than to see its powers 
abused by bad men. The remedy must and will in time 
be a plied. If I can but point to it I shall have done good 
service. The city's welfare and the State's prosperity are 
most dear to my heart, are bound up with the fibres of 
my being. My prayers must and will ever be, God save 
our beloved ciry of Philadelphia; God save the Common- 
wealth of Pennsylvania. 

ELI K PRICE. 



Note. — Two suggestions have been made to me by an 
eminent legal mind : First, That there is no provision 
made for the appointment of a Prothonotary of the 
Supreme Court, now vested in the judges of that court 
by the existing Constitution. Second, That the members 
elect to the Legislature shall be the first General Assem- 
bly under the proposed Constitution. This was deemed 
necessary in the Schedule of 1838. It has been deemed 
necessary as to every judge and officer in the State by the 
late Convention. Are we to have no Legislature for 1*74 ? 

E. K P. 



